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STUDENT WORK
The Codification of Rule 10b-5 Private Actions in
the Proposed Federal Securities Code
PETER J. VALETA*
The author examines the effect the proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code has upon existing statutory and decisional law in rule
l0b-5 private actions. Though the Code makes few changes in the
applicable substantive law, it does introduce an element of con-
sistency and harmony into an area burdened by statutory overlap
and imprecision. The author adjudges this aspect of the Code to
be one of its most significant contributions to the field of securi-
ties law.
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One of the greatest challenges to the draftsmen of the proposed
Federal Securities Code' was presented by section 10(b) l and rule
* Candidate for Juris Doctor degree, University of Miami School of Law, May, 1980.
1. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Proposed Official Draft, March 1978) 1hereinafter FED.
SEC. CODEI.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The topic of private
action under these provisions presently is "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 4 In the process of
codification, therefore, it was necessary for the draftsmen to recon-
cile and incorporate the hundreds of decisions which hav applied
and construed the relatively sparse language of the above provi-
sions.
This judicially-imposed nature of private actions under rule
lOb-5 presents a body of law with such unsettled parameters that it
does not lend itself to direct "pigeonholing." Therefore, any exami-
nation of the treatment of this area under the Code must begin with
an exposition of the relevant Code provisions, followed by a compar-
ison with analogous case law.
This article is not an extended discussion and commentary on
the topic of civil liability for securities violations. Innumerable
works have already been produced in that field and articles continue
to appear as its fringes change. Rather, an effort has been made to
describe the similarities and differences between the judicial law of
rule 10b-5 and the corresponding codification,' and to provide guid-
ance for interpretation of the Code.'
Parts I and II discuss the prohibitions of rule 10b-5 as they
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
3. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
4. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
5. "Those who appraise the product must compare it with the law as it now stands, not
with the statutes and their gloss as they would like to have them be." Wechsler, Forward to
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE at viii (1978).
6. Wherever differences have been found, however, an effort has been made to evaluate
the changes.
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appear in the Code and the liabilities and defenses thereto. Part III
covers secondary liability that can be imposed in addition to that
of the primary violator. Other defenses, common to many of the
liability provisions, are presented in Part IV, while Part V discusses
the remedies available in actions against violators.
II. GENERAL ANTIFRAUD LIABILITY
The general antifraud provisions of the proposed Federal
Securities Code are found in section 1602. Its terms gather the
many prohibitions against fraudulent conduct presently scattered
throughout the securities acts,7 thereby eliminating much of the
redundancy and overlap which presently exists.' The general anti-
fraud aspects of rule 10b-5 are encompassed by section 1602(a),
which states that "It is unlawful for any person to engage in a
fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with
(1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or buy a security,
or an inducement not to buy or sell a security ... "
A. Definitions
The scope of this section can only be understood through exam-
ination of its key terms; which are defined in Part II of the Code."'
"Fraudulent act"" is broadly defined to include "an act, device,
scheme, practice, or course of conduct that (1) is fraudulent or (2)
operates or would operate as a fraud.' Silence or inaction, where
7. This section encompasses, in addition to rule lob-5 § 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, §§ 9(a)(4), 10(b), 13(e), 14(e) and 15(c) (1-2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and rules 14a-9(a) and 15(c) (1-2) adopted thereunder, § 17(j) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, and § 206 (1-2,4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
8. For example, fraudulent conduct in connection with a sale of securities violates the
letter of both rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) of the '33 Act (the source of the language of rule 1tb-5).
9. FED. SEC. CODE § 1602(a).
10. In Part II the Code aggregates the definition of terms which are common to multiple
provisions, thereby aiding the creation of internal consistency and harmony.
11. Id. § 262(a).
12. Unfortunately, the use of the term "fraud" in defining "fraudulent" may create the
same problems which the courts faced in interpreting the first and third clauses of rule 10-5
(which also use the term "fraud"): Does use of the term "fraud" in these contexts require
incorporation of the common law elements of knowledge, intent, and reliance? See PROSSER,
ToRS § 105 (4th ed. 1971).
Because the Code later defines and incorporates these elements for specific types of
liability, however, it may be argued that the term "fraud" is intended in a broader sense:
Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity, properly includes all acts,
omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an
undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
there is a duty to act or speak, is expressly included therein. :' The
existence of a fraudulent act, however, can only be found where the
person in question acts with knowledge of, or in reckless disregard
of, the fraudulent character of his actions. 4
"Misrepresentation" is the second activity proscribed by sec-
tion 1602(a). It is described as "(1) an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact, or (2) an omission to state a material fact necessary to
prevent the statements made from being misleading in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made."'" The key phrase in
this provision is the term "material fact,""' which broadly encom-
passes "(a) a promise, prediction, estimate, projection, or forecast,
or (b) a statement of intention, motive, opinion or law."' 7 Objective
criteria are provided, however, which insure that estimates can be
made without fear of unjustified accusations of misrepresentation if
the projections do not develop as predicted."
The definition of materiality in the Code incorporates the
"substantial likelihood" standard of TSC Industries, Inc. v. North-
way, Inc. '5 into the analysis of .the importance that the reasonable
person would give the fact under scrutiny in choosing his course of
action.' Furthermore, the Code qualifies that determination where
communications are made in situations analogous to face-to-face
transactions. Regardless of what the reaction of a reasonable person
1 STORY, EQUITY JR. § 187, quoted from Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889), in SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
13. FED. SEC. CODE § 262(b).
14. Id. § 262(c). Under § 1819(a)(4), however, § 262(c) would not apply or be necessary
for purposes of an action to enjoin a violation of § 1602(a). Section 1819(a)(4) appears to
codify existing law under SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
But see SEC v. Aaron, 2d Cir. #77-6091 (Mar. 13, 1979). In any event, § 1819(a)(4)(B) expands
the scope of injunctive reach for fraudulent acts to situations where, regardless of intent,
deception is indicated.
15. FED. SEC. CODE § 297 (a).
16. It should be noted that the draftsmen intended to reflect current judicial implica-
tions in l0b-5 actions that the statements be materially untrue, and that the plaintiff has
been materially misled. See FED. SEC. CODE § 259, comment (2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
Accord, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
17. FED. SEC. CODE § 256.
18. "A statement of fact ... is not a misrepresentation if it (1) is made in good faith,
(2) has a reasonable basis when it is made, and (3) complies with any applicable rule so far
as underlying assumptions or other conditions are concerned." Id. § 297(b).
19. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). There the Court rejected the Court of Appeals' standard of
materiality as encompassing anything that "a reasonable shareholder might consider impor-
tant" because it could extend liability to the mere possibility, however unlikely, that trivial
items "might" become important. Id. at 445, 448-49.
20. FED. SEC. CODE § 293(a). The application of this test is expressly limited to "under
the circumstances," so that all relevant factors about a given plaintiff are included in the
"reasonable person" test.
[Vol. 33:1615
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would be, materiality will be found when a person, in his communi-
cations with a small number of people, has actual knowledge that a
given recipient will or is substantially likely to consider those facts
given as important in determining a course of action."'
"Fraudulent acts" and "misrepresentations" as thus defined
are prohibited "in connection with" offers to buy or sell, induce-
ments not to buy or sell, and actual purchases or sales of a security.22
As under rule 10b-5, this phrase indicates the necessity that there
be a nexus between the fraud and the offer, inducement, purchase
or sale.23 There is no indication that the Code requires anything
beyond the loose "touching" nexus presently recognized under 10b-
5. Similarly, the definitions in present securities laws of sale, pur-
chase, buy and offer have been carried over into the Code without
alteration.25
B. Elements of a Cause of Action
It is now necessary to determine who is protected by the above
prohibition and can therefore bring an action for its violation. Under
rule 10b-5 a plaintiff in a civil action is required to be either a buyer
or a seller,2" but there is no express provision in the Code on this
point. While the terminology of many sections of Part XVII of the
Code, which deals with civil liability, suggests no other qualification
for bringing an action, the expressly recognized capacity of courts
to imply new private actions leaves this question open.27 In any
event, there has been no change in the ability of a corporation to
bring an action as a purchaser."
Section 1703 describes the civil liabilities of a seller or buyer
who has violated section 1602(a)(1).11 In a non-market setting,
21. Id. § 293(b). Similarly, there can be no misrepresentation where he knows that a
given recipient will not consider the facts important. Id.
22. Id. § 1602(a)(1).
23. See 5 JACOBS, THE IMPAcT OF RULE 10b-5, § 38.01(b) (1978).
24. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). Only
some relation between the fraud and the purchase or sale is required. It is not necessary that
the proscribed conduct affect the trading process. Nor is there any distinction between a
security transaction in connection with fraud, or fraud in connection with a securities transac-
tion. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1013 (1973).
25. See FED. SEC. CODE §§ 299.32, .11, .12, .46.
26. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
27. FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a). Subsection (b), however, does limit this with regard to an
inducement not to buy or sell.
28. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Section 1703(c) limits the application of its provisions to areas outside § 1704. 'That
section establishes express civil liability for misrepresentations and omissions in the registra-
19791 1619
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where "the matching of buyers and sellers [would not be] substan-
tially fortuitous," the violator would be liable to his buyer or seller.:"
Yet where "the transaction is effected in a manner that would make
the matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous," anyone
"who buys or sells between (1) the day when the defendant first
unlawfully sells or buys and (2) the day when all material facts...
become generally available" could recover."
Taken literally, this section does not appear to create liability
in any situation of fraudulent action or misrepresentation where the
defendant has not bought or sold, despite the draftsmens' assertion
to the contrary, 2 except in cases of insider trading 3 or investment
advising." Outside of these Code provisions, there is an action for
fraudulent acts or misrepresentations in documents:5 as well as for
common law fraud for such behavior. Both of these require that the
defendant have traded. Furthermore, where the violation is one of
silence, the statute is unclear as to whether the draftsmen intended
to impose an affirmative duty of disclosure under some circumstan-
ces.3" In any event, a cause of action could be judicially implied after
consideration of the equities in any given case.37
tion and offering statements, and the general and other reports filed with the Commission.
Therefore, § 1704 parallels the liabilities created under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. This
limitation appears to be directed at avoiding any overlap of liabilities. This is important
because the civil liability provisions in the Code each set forth specific standards, burdens of
proof, defenses, and remedies, in combinations that are directed to particular violations.
Were overlap permitted in this area, the design, balance, and consistency sought by the
draftsmen would be threatened. Compare § 1703(f) with § 1704(f) (both dealing with defenses
based on defendant's conduct).
30. FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(a).
31. Id. § 1703(b). The concept of "generally available" has been objectified in § 265. A
detailed exposition of this appears below in the context of insider trading regulation.
32. "Sellers as well as buyers are given an express right of' action by § 1703 for any
person's misrepresentations or fraudulent acts . FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, comment (2)(1)
(emphasis in original).
33. Civil liability for insider trading and the related topic of tipping (which may give
rise to liability without trading by defendant) (treated in more detail below) is expressly
provided for under § 1703(a-b) also.
34. See id. § 1709(c), which sets forth civil liability for fraudulent acts or misrepresen-
tations on the part of investment advisors.
35. E.g., § 1704. See note 29 supra.
36. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (an undue delay, not in good faith, in revealing
facts, can be deceptive, misleading, or a device to defraud under rule 10b-5). It may be argued
that this question should be resolved in the same manner as the general question about the
application of federal securities laws to charges of corporate mismanagement. That question
is unresolved under rule lOb-5, see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)(holding
only that there is no lOb-5 action without deception or misrepresentation), as well as under
the Code. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 comment 2 (y) at 534.
37. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a).
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By providing objective criteria for determining the identity of
plaintiffs in the market transaction, section 1703(b) establishes the
liability implied under rule 10b-5 more clearly. :" Yet, where the
transaction in question is effected in a manner which allows match-
ing of buyers and sellers, the defendant is not, and should not, be
liable to persons outside that group. Unless such a violator commits
the fraudulent act or misrepresentation in a manner that is publi-
cally noticeable,39 it is unlikely that his acts could have caused
anyone other than his buyer or seller any harm."'
In the market transaction, no liability attaches prior to unlaw-
ful buying or selling because causation is lacking.' Similarly, after
the information in question becomes "generally available,"' a
plaintiff's losses or gains cannot be attributed to the defendant.
While under this formula a defendant may be subject to claims not
related to his fraudulent act or misrepresentation, the approach
may be justified on several grounds. First, because determining lia-
bility by allocating the burden of proof cannot be done objectively
in a market transaction with any accuracy, this construction pre-
sents one method of insuring the inclusion of all potential plaintiffs.
Second, there are certain policies which are advanced by use of this
method . 3 The general scheme of investor protection is promoted by
not foreclosing this remedy to a potential plaintiff. Also, the deter-
rence of undesirable behavior is necessarily enhanced by the added
potential liability." Finally, the defendant's liability is not abso-
lute; section 1703 sets forth defenses which can narrow it.
C. Defenses
One defense relates to the correction of misrepresentations and
omissions:
A defendant has a defense to an action under section 1703(b) for
violation of section 1602 (a) . ..if he proves that the misrepre-
38. See, e.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 102 (D. Colo.
1971).
39. In such a case, he would be subject to other express liabilities. See FED. SEC. CODE
§§ 1604(c), 1707.
40. If the defendant's non-market transaction was sufficient to harm one other than his
buyer or seller due to price or volume fluctuations in the market, he may be deemed to be
manipulating, and thus incur liability. See id. §§ 1609(c), 1710.
41. This assumes, of course, that it is the act of buying or selling which is the s ine qua
non for damages. See note 36 supra.
42. See note 76 and accompanying text infra.
43. See 5 JACOBS, supra note 23, at § 6 passim.
44. But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40 n.26 (1977).
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sentation or omission was corrected by means of a filing or press
release or in any other manner reasonably designed to bring the
correction to the attention of the investing public, except that
this defense is not available against a plaintiff who bought or sold
(1) before the facts as corrected became generally available or (2)
in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or omission. Reli-
ance on an omission is proved by proof of reliance on the particu-
lar filing or document and ignorance of the omission; but reliance
on either a misrepresentation or an omission may be proved with-
out proof that the plaintiff read a particular filing or document."5
As a result of this provision, there is an incentive for a defendant,
actual or potential, to make corrections as quickly as possible in
order to reduce his potential liability." Once he has made this
correction generally available,47 liability accrues only upon a show-
ing of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff. While reliance
is defined in the second sentence of section 1703(d), the modifier
"justifiable" in the first sentence seems to suggest that an affirma-
tive burden of proof is required from a plaintiff asserting reliance."
The question of what constitutes the plaintiff's burden also
arises with regard to the defense of "plaintiff's knowledge."4" "A
defendant has a defense if he proves (1) that the plaintiff bought or
sold with knowledge of the relevant facts or documents as they
should have been disclosed or corrected, or (2) that any alleged
falsity was obvious."' " Actual knowledge, of course, means that the
plaintiff was not really misled. The "obvious falsity" standard of
clause (2), however, is not clear in and of itself. To the extent that
45. FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(d).
46. One also has a duty to correct any statements of material fact made in a communica-
tion authorized by him regarding a purchase or sale, an offer to purchase or sell, or an
ind"cement not to do so, which have become misrepresentative due to a subsequent event.
Whaie a reasonable effort will satisfy the requirements for performance of this duty, failure
to • ke such a correction will give rise to liability under § 1703. See id. § 1602(b).
7. See note 76 and accompanying text infra.
48. Some courts have required proof of justifiable reliance (i.e., not only that the plaintiff
relied, but that a reasonable man would have done so.) See Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 288 (3d Cir. 1972). This may imply a due diligence requirement on the
plaintiff's part. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 737 (8th Cir. 1967). Others have
rejected such a stringent requirement. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
n.3 (2d Cir. 1965). It is therefore unclear what the draftsmen meant by "justifiable reliance."
It would seem reasonable, however, to place an affirmative burden of due diligence on the
plaintiff once the defendant has made a threshold showing that he corrected (in the
"generally available" sense) before the plaintiff traded.
49. "The fact that any or all of the directors and officers of a company plaintiff are
defendants with knowledge of a fact does not of itself establish the company's knowledge of
the fact." FED. SEC. CODE § 287(b).
50. Id. § 1703(e).
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it was intended to reflect current case law, that lack of clarity is
consistent.5 Perhaps the most realistic approach would be to decide
the question of obviousness in light of the nature of the plaintiff,52
rather than by a nebulous "reckless" or "due diligence" standard.
By focusing attention on to whom it is obvious, the plaintiff's knowl-
edge is determined.not by abstract standards, but by the nature of
the violation in question.
A defendant has a second defense based on the reasonableness
of his conduct. In the non-market transaction he has an absolute
defense if he can prove "that, as of the time of the sale, he reason-
ably did not believe that there was a misrepresentation."' : Reasona-
bleness is based on the standard of the "prudent man under the
circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs."'" Therefore, every
buyer or seller who could face liability under these provisions has a
duty to perform the same investigation and inspection that an issuer
must undertake with regard to his securities, without regard to
whether he is connected with the sources of any misrepresentations
or omission.55 It may be impossible to qualify for this defense where
there are informational materials available that the defendant did
not create. In such a situation it will probably be necessary to con-
strue this standard liberally due to the near impossibility of compli-
ance with its requirements.
Other defenses are available under the Code. Given their gen-
eral applicability to the several types of civil liabilities, discussion
of them is best deferred to a later portion of this article. '" In addition
the remedies available have a broad application and are better
treated as a separate subject.
III. INSIDER TRADING
The prohibition against insider trading and trading by persons
51. See Depuy v. Depuy, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)(White, J., dissenting from denial ofcertior-
art) (the standard of care required of plaintiffs under 10b-5 actions described as nonreckless-
ness, gross conduct, unreasonable conduct and due diligence).
52. Among the factors that could be weighed are the plaintiff's general investment expe-
rience and practice, as well as his specific knowledge and experience.
53. FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(f)(1). In the market transaction he would have a similar
defense except that it would not be available to the issuer. Id. § 1703 (f)(2).
54. Id. § 1703(g). See also id. § 299.34 (definition of reasonable).
55. This conclusion is confirmed on examination of earlier drafts of this provision which
excluded any reference in the standard to "in the conduct of his own affairs" or the like. In
commentary thereto the draftsmen indicated a desire to differentiate between the duty to
one's own informational distributions and those of another. See FED. SEC. CODE § 402(d) and
comments following.
56. See Part IV infra.
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"tipped" to inside information is a broad area of liability implied
under rule 10b-5. There is no literal prohibition contained therein;
rather, civil liability has been justified on the grounds that it is
inherently unfair for one who possesses information intended only
for business purposes to take advantage of that information while
knowing that it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.57
The Code has apparently accepted this rationale, and provides
express prohibitions against such conduct. Section 1603 states:
It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer,
if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer
of the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insi-
der reasonably believes that the fact is generally available or (2),
if the other party to the transaction (or his agent) is identified,
(A) the insider reasonably believes that that person knows it, or
(B) that person in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise."
An insider is subject to civil liability not because he bought or sold
securities on the basis of inside information, but because he cor-
rectly perceived that such information provided an unfair advan-
tage in dealing with another party. The insider must prove lack of
intent to take advantage of the other party based on a reasonable
belief in the knowledge of that party, or that such intent was ne-
gated by the fact that the other party knew of the information.
A. Definitions
The present uncertainty under rule 10b-5 as to who is an in-
sider"9 is reduced by the objective definition set forth in section
1603(b). "Insider" would, of course, include the issuer, its officers
and directors, and all other persons "controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with, the issuer."'"' In addition, anyone out-
side these classes who has or had access to inside information as a
result of a present or prior relationship with the issuer is an insider. ",
57. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1962).
58. FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a).
59. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1962), for example, the status of an
insider appeared to depend on his access to inside information. The Second Circuit seems to
have added an alternative class of insiders (i.e., not only those having access, but those
possessing the inside information). See SEC v. Texas Gull' Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nor Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (omitting reference,
however, to the Cady, Roberts "access" test). See also 5 JACOBS, supra note 23, at § 66.02(a)
n.21 (listing cases post-Texas Gulf Sulphur that discuss but do not resolve these tests).
60. FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b)(1-2). See also definitions of director, id. § 241, officer, id.
§ 299.15, and control, id. § 230 (discussed infra at notes 108-111 and accompanying text).
61. Id. § 1603 (b)(3). The prohibition against trading by such a person, however, applies
[Vol. 33:1615
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The Code also includes within the class of insiders the group
commonly referred to under rule 10b-5 as "tippers." "' Insider'
means . . . a person who learns such a fact from a person specified
in section 1603(b) (including a person specified in section 1603(b)
(4)) with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact
is such a person . .. .I' Under this definition, the issue is not
whether one received the information directly from a tipper or indi-
rectly from a tippee,"3 but whether one knows that one is trading on
the basis of inside information. 4 All persons who are aware of the
inside nature of the information on which they are trading are con-
sidered insiders.65
The persons described above are prohibited from trading if they
know a "fact of special significance . . . that is not generally avail-
able . . . . ,1 Each of these phrases is treated as a term of art under
the Code and is separately defined. A fact"7 may be "of special
significance" in two ways. It must either be material and be likely
to impact on the market price of a security if generally known" or
only to the extent that he knows the inside information by virtue of that relationship. Id. §
1603(c). He could trade on information received in any other manner not prohibited.
62. Id. § 1603(b)(4).
63. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd
on this point, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (tipper liability
regarding direct tippees only); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (plaintiff
who was an indirect tippee barred by in part delicto defense); Investors Management Co.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 9267 (1971) (declaring that institutional-type remote tippees pose a greater
danger than do the tippers who tip them).
64. This concept has been referred to in several decisions, but there have not been any
holdings to that extent. See, e.g. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1974); Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852; Faberge, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act. Release No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973).
Such a restriction is also unnecessary in light of § 1724(c), which extends the liability of the
tippee to the tipper. See notes 129-134 and accompanying text infra. Under the broad defini-
tion of insider under § 1603(b)(4), this liability could be extended without regard to how far
removed a tippee may be. Furthermore, the door is left open for the Commission or a court
to decline to treat a tippee as an insider where "it would be inequitable, on consideration of
the circumstances and the purposes of the Code (including the deterrent effect of liability)
. " FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (b)(4).
65. The term "knowledge" is not specifically defined, but is to be interpreted in context.
FED. SEC. CODE § 287. In the realm of civil liability this should mean more than negligent
use of inside information. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). The
question is left open whether actual knowledge or a lesser standard (e.g., reckless disregard)
will suffice. Cf. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.50 (defining scienter).
66. Id. § 1603(a).
67. Recall that "fact" itself is defined. See id. § 256. See also note 17 supra and accompa-
nying text.
68. Id. § 257(a). This market-impact approach was applied by the trial court in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) citing List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) and Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963). The Second Circuit, however, held that a broader standard applies, relying on List v.
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it must be especially important to a reasonable person in determin-
ing his course of action. Factors to be considered in determining
whether the fact is especially important include the specificity of
the fact and the difference between it and information generally
available, as well as the nature and reliability of the fact.'
By providing a two-prong test for determining whether a fact
is of special significance, the drafters intended to create a more
exact definition of inside information than the definition of
"material fact" found in the Code."' The, first prong adds the re-
quirement of market impact to the fact of materiality. The second
prong provides a slightly stricter standard than the materiality
standard by requiring that the fact be "especially important" in
light of the factors listed in the previous paragraph. An insider,
then, is one who has access not just to a material fact, but to a fact
of special significance. It is this type of information that an insider
has a duty to disclose before he may trade in reliance on it, or, if' he
is prohibited from disclosing it, to refrain from trading.7'
Significant reliance upon the reasonable investor test indicates
a judgment that this prohibition should be predicated on its effects
on individuals, and perhaps reflects policy objectives such as reduc-
tion of informational inequities and equal access to the rewards of
securities investment. Nevertheless, the abstract detachment
which inevitably follows any reasonable person test, especially
where it is applied through hindsight, can easily result in an unreal-
istic picture. 3 The market place by its very nature is both an evalu-
ator of information and a reflector of individual effects in the aggre-
gate. Considering that the persons most likely to alter their invest-
ment behavior had the inside information been available to all are
those who decide whether or not to trade on the basis of the price
Fashion Park for the reasonable investor test in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849. See
note 70 and accompanying text infra.
69. FED. SEc. CODE § 257(b).
70. Id. § 293. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
71. This may be viewed as the desire of the draftsmen when one considers that previous
versions included the stricter standard of "decisive importance" rather than "especially
important." See Id. § 1303(c).
72. The Second Circuit suggested that these are the underlying policies of the insider
trading prohibition. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-52, 858.
73. It is possible that the market-impact test may also give an unrealistic picture. It may
be inconclusive, for example, where the information at issue affects investors so differently
that the net market-impact is negligible (i.e., some investors are induced to buy and others
to sell). Such a result, however may indicate that the value of the information is not intrinsic,
but rather lies in the individual's ability correctly to assess and use the data. In that situation
the insider who trades is not advantaged by possession of the information, but by his particu-
lar skills and experience, so that prohibiting such possession serves no purpose.
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of a security, the market-impact test more accurately indicates
what information is "of special significance."7 Furthermore, the
market-impact test allows businessmen to judge with greater cer-
tainty what information falls within the prohibited classification
because determinations of market-impact are regularly made by
them and their advisors in other contexts. While this standard is by
no means "scientifically" objective, it does offer a more refined
analysis of the impact of inside information than does the reasona-
ble person test.
The Code provides for a one-week "safe harbor" period, provid-
ing certain conditions are met. After one week a fact is automati-
cally considered to be generally available.75 If the fact has not been
disclosed by a filing or press release, the burden of proving general
availability is placed on the one asserting the defense. In such cases,
whether a fact is generally available is a question of fact to be
determined by applying standards used under 10b-5. 71 The new
"safe harbor" rule provides businessmen with a clearer standard for
determining when trading would be 'safe' for them.77
74. See MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), for a discussion of
insider trading and its effects on "time-function" versus "price-function" investors.
This test may also allow the use of actual market-impact evidence more easily than the
reasonable-investor test. Such information is likely to be available because a violation of
insider trading provisions surfaces only upon disclosure and because the time lag before
prosecution would allow the market to assess and reflect the importance of that information.
Such evidence is more easily adapted to the market-impact test than others and with less
likelihood of confusion.
75. A fact is "generally available" one week (or any other period prescribed
by Commission rule) after it is disclosed by means of a filing or press release or
in any other manner reasonably designed to bring it to the attention of the invest-
ing public. Otherwise the burden of proving that a fact is "generally available"
is on the person who so asserts.
FED. SEC. CODE § 265
76. The factual nature of this inquiry has inhibited the clear articulation of standards
for determining what efforts are reasonably directed to making facts publicly known and fbr
judging the success of those efforts. See e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 853-54. The type of media
used is a relevant factor to be considered. See Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co.,
535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976) (newspapers), Faberge, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. No. 10,174 (May
25, 1973) (broad tape). Yet this is by no means certain. Compare Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,
520 F.2d 1373, 1379-80 (2d Cir. 1975) (information appearing in small print in table of bond
prices in the New York Times, in local newspapers, and on New York Stock Exchange ticker
held not publicly disclosed) with Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1975) (two
brief notices in local papers may be adequate dissemination).
77. The "safe harbor" approach has been advocated by some authorities in the context
of rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854 n.18; Sandler & Conwill, Texas
Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIo L. J. 225, 264 n.184 (1969). In
fact, the SEC has considered such a rule, but thus far has declined to issue one. See 5 JACOBS,
supra note 23, at § 66.02[g] n.45.
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In summary, where an insider possesses a "fact of special signi-
ficance" about an issuer and its security which is not "generally
available," he is prohibited from buying or selling that security,5
with two exceptions. One exception arises where "the insider rea-
sonably believes that the fact is generally available . . . . ",7 The
second deals with face-to-face transactions. If the insider reasonably
believes that the other party to the transaction knows the fact or if'
that party actually knows, there is no prohibition against trading.'"
These are, of course, common sense exceptions. Failure to allow
conduct based upon reasonable beliefs would face insiders with the
continual risk of "trade-at-your-peril" without any legitimizing rea-
son. There is no unfairness in a face-to-face transaction where one
party reasonably believes the other party is acting with the same
knowledge. Nor is the transaction fraudulent where one party be-
lieves he is acting without knowledge on the part of the other, if that
party in fact has actual knowledge.
B. Liability and Defenses
Civil liability for violation of the prohibition against insider
trading arises under the same provisions as does liability for viola-
tions of the more general antifraud provisions discussed in Part 1."
This liability extends only to actual purchasers or sellers of' securi-
ties and not to those who simply failed to act as a result of the inside
information" In the non-market transaction, an insider is liable
only to his buyer or seller, while in the market setting, he is liable
to anyone buying or selling between the day he first traded and the
day the facts of special significance became generally available.," An
insider who has committed a violation by trading can attempt to
make his knowledge generally available in order to limit his liability
The semi-objective nature of the Code's formula becomes apparent where disclosure is
not effected by a filing or a press release. In that situation, the question of whether the means
used were "reasonably designed to bring it to the attention of the investing public" is at
issue FED. SEC. CODE § 265. The corresponding decisional law under rule 10b-5 probably sets
forth the criteria for this determination. See note 76 infra.
78. Under the Code's inclusive definitions of buy and sell, FED. SEC. CODE §§ 219,
299.46(a), insiders would probably be prohibited from placing orders with their brokers with
instructions to delay execution until a public announcement is made under rule 10b-5. See
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 891 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gull'
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 853 n.17.
79. FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a)(1).
80. Id. § 1603(a)(2).
81. Id. § 1703. See notes 26-44 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
83. Id. § 1703(a-b). See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
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and may thereby be able to raise the defense of correction against
some plaintiffs. 4 He also may have an express defense based on the
plaintiff's knowledge. 5 Other defenses common to civil liability ac-
tions under the Code, as well as means of measuring damages, are
outlined below.
One defense presently recognized under rule 10b-5 appears,
however, to have been omitted from the Code. It arises where it has
been proven that the insider's decision to trade was not based on
his inside information .8 The prohibition of section 1603(a) arises if
the insider merely knows a fact of special significance. 7 This creates
a presumption that such an insider is trading on the basis of his
knowledge, without provision for an affirmative showing of pro-
priety.
88
On the whole, there has been little departure from the insider
trading doctrine of rule 10b-5. Some standards of determination are
more objective and others have been clarified. Under the Code,
insiders, including tippees, are faced with the same choice they now
have under rule 10b-5: either disclose, or abstain from trading
and tipping. 9 Otherwise, they must take the risk of committing a
violation.
IV. SECONDARY LIABILITY'"
One result of the efforts to develop conciseness and uniformity
in the Code is the separate provisions defining and describing ele-
ments of civil liability common to any private action for damages.
By and large they represent a codification of other portions of exist-
ing 10b-5 decisional law.
84. Id. § 1703(d). See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra. This defense is limited
to where the plaintiff actually bought or sold before the facts became generally available.
85. Id. at 1703(e). See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
86. This may be superfluous, however, since § 1603(a) creates an exception to the prohi-
bition based on the plaintiff's knowledge. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 65 supra.
88. It is not clear how an irrebuttable presumption furthers the goals of this provision.
See note 57 and accompanying text supra. While a defendant may have to carry a severe
burden of proof to show that his trading was not due to any inside knowledge about the
securities traded, there is no apparent justification of not allowing at least the opportunity
to make such a showing.
89. One may not even have this choice if one is unable to effect disclosure (e.g., where
one possesses inside information about a company with which he is not associated). See
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974).
90. Primary liability, as the term is referred to in this article, is incurred by the active
violator of § 1602 or § 1603. One who is liable by virtue of the provisions described in this
Part (they are not the direct violators) are referred to as secondarily liable.
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A. Fiduciary Relationship
One provision is designed to deal with fiduciary liability not
directly governed by the provisions of section 1703.1' The operation
of section 1709 is triggered upon violation of section 1602(a)(1)"2 or
1602(b)(1) (A)93 by a fiduciary in connection with a purchase or sale
either for himself or for his beneficiary.9 4 If the beneficiary suffers a
loss by reason of the violation, his fiduciary is liable to the extent
of the loss. 5
Roles that are commonly considered fiduciary in nature " are
included in the catch-all phrase "or other fiduciary," so that the
substance of a particular position rules over its form. 7 Directors are
expressly declared to be fiduciaries as. well.9 There are also indica-
tions that other people associated with corporations could be consid-
ered fiduciaries under this provision just as they have been under
91. "Section 1709 [fiduciary liability] does not apply to the extent that section 1703
• . .applies." Id. § 1709(d). See the discussion of § 1703 in Part I, notes 26-44 and accompa-
nying text supra.
92. See notes 7-25 and accompanying text supra (prohibition against fraudulent acts or
misrepresentations in connection with a purchase or sale of a security).
93. See note 46 and accompanying text supra (duty to correct misrepresentations).
94. An agent, director, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver,
or other fiduciary who, in connection with effecting a purchase or sale of a security
for the account or benefit of himself or a person or estate to whom he stands in a
fiduciary relationship (herein a "beneficiary"),
1. violates section 1602(a)(1) by means of a fraudulent act, or a
misrepresentation made with scienter, or
2. fails to correct a statement of a material fact (A) as required by
section 1602(b)(1)(A) if the fiduciary acquired scienter with respect to
the subsequent event there referred to as of a time sufficiently in
advance of the purchase or sale to have had a reasonable opportunity
to make the correction, or (B) to reflect the fiduciary's acquisition of
scienter, as of such a time with respect to a misrepresentation pre-
viously made,
is liable to his company in the case of a director or a person who is a fiduciary by
reason only of his being a controlling person of the company, or his beneficiary in
the case of any other fiduciary, for any loss caused to the company or beneficiary
by the violation or failure to correct.
FED. SEC. CODE § 1709(a).
95. The Code also provides that the reverse of this proposition is true. If the beneficiary
in a fiduciary relationship makes a misrepresentation or fails to correct one, he will be liable
for any loss caused thereby. Id. § 1709(b).
96. "An agent . ..trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver .... .. Id. §
1709(a).
97. Attorneys and accountants, for example, who committed a violation would probably
be liable to their clients for losses caused thereby. Cf. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286
F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970).
98. See note 94 supra.
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rule 10b-5."
The liability of these fiduciaries arises only if they have com-
mitted the violation in question with scienter.'10 Scienter is defined
by the Code in terms of "actual knowledge" or "reckless disregard"
of whether the statement is truthful.'0 ' If the violation arises from a
failure to correct,' 2 however, the fiduciary is liable only if he ac-
quired scienter sufficiently before the purchase or sale to have af-
forded him "a reasonable opportunity to make the correction.""'
Furthermore, a fiduciary who was not under a duty to correct"' is




Secondary liability also exists under circumstances other than
a fiduciary relationship. "A person who controlled a person liable
under this Code . . . at the time of any act giving rise to liability
whether the controlled person is liable directly or by virtue of
section 1724, is liable to the same extent as the controlled person
99. Section 1709(a) expressly creates a fiduciary position by reason of one's status as a
"controlling person of the company." See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) (controlling stockholders as well as officers owe the corporation
fiduciary duties). Even the status of majority stockholder may be sufficient to raise a fidu-
ciary duty vis-a-vis minority shareholders. See Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 412 U.S. 920 (1973). But see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1976) (§ 10b requires a private action to pass a "manipulative or deceptive" test, not
merely unfairness by a fiduciary).
Broker/dealer liability (a topic beyond the scope of this article) can also arise under this
provision as it does under 10b-5. See, e.g., Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Investment advisors, however, are expressly subject to liability hereunder. FED. SEC. CODE §
1709(c).
100. See note 94 supra.
101. "A person makes . . . a misrepresentation with 'scienter' if he knows that he is
making a misrepresentation (or a misrepresentation is being made) or acts in reckless disre-
gard of whether that is so." Id. § 299.50. While this is the first mention of this element
essential to a private action under rule lOb-5 (see, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976)), a similar requirement was engrafted into the definitions of misrepresentation,
FED. SEC. CODE § 297, and fraudulent act, id. § 262. See notes 11-16 and accompanying text
supra. A "scienter-like" requirement is also attached to § 1602 (b)(1)(A) (duty to correct) in
the form of the defense of a reasonable belief that no misrepresentation existed to correct.
Id. § 1703(f)(2). See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
103. FED. SEC. CODE. § 1709(a)(2)(A).
104. Recall that under § 1602(b)(1), the duty to correct falls only upon the person who
made the statement of material fact which became a misrepresentation or under whose
authority it was made.
105. Id. § 1709(a)(2)(B).
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... -, 01 This provision is the counterpart of section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.107
Control is expressly defined in part II of the Code."518 As in the
present law, it includes both de jure power'"' and de facto power.I'
One who owns or has the power to vote more than twenty-five per-
cent of the outstanding voting shares of a company or, where there
are no voting securities, twenty-five percent of the total equity, is
presumed to control that company for purposes of this provision."'
Of course, the controlling person must have been in control at the
time of the violation."
2
The Code provisions are not the exclusive means of determining
liability. Liability as a controlling person arises directly under com-
mon law agency principles without operation of section 1724. 1' In
such situations, he has those defenses recognized under the common
law of agency in addition to those of the Code.
If his liability flows from section 1724, however, he is restricted
to Code defenses."' An additional defense is set forth in section
1724:
[A] controlling person who would not be liable for an act of the
controlled person apart from section 1724(a) is not liable under
the section if he proves (A) that he reasonably did not believe
that the controlled person's conduct was unlawful or a breach of
duty, or involved a fraudulent act, a misrepresentation, or non-
106. Id. § 1724(a).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
108. "Control" means the power, directly or indirectly, to exercise a control-
ling influence over the management and policies of a company or the activities
of a natural person (either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding
with one or more other persons), whether through the ownership of voting securi-
ties, through one or more intermediary persons, by contract, or otherwise.
FED. SEC. CODE § 230(a).
109. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975).
110. See id. at 890 n.19. Cf. SEC v. Zimmerman, 407 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D.D.C. 1976)
(§ 13(a) of Securities Exchange Act) (actual power even though at the sufferance of' another).
111. FED. SEC. CODE § 230(b)(1). In this situation, all others are presumed not to control
by virtue of ownership or voting power. Id. § 230(b)(2). Yet either of these presumptions "may
be rebutted by evidence." Id. § 230(b)(4).
112. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
113. Such liability may arise whether the controlling person actually failed to fulfill his
duties as a principal, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-14 (1958), or was without
fault in his behavior, e.g., id. §§ 257-58. The application of agency principles as federal law
under the securities laws is not a new concept. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515
F.2d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1973);
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970). But see Kamen &
Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1967).
114. See notes 45-55 and accompanying text supra.
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disclosure of a fact of special significance by an insider (as de-
fined in section 1603(b)). . .. 15
This defense appears to be substantially the same as the "good
faith" defense set forth in section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934"'' and stands on sound logical grounds. As long as the
controlling person is not a direct violator"7 and as long as there are
no external policy reasons for the extension of liability,"' there is
little reason for attaching liability to one who has relied on his
reasonable beliefs, in good faith."'
C. Aiding and Abetting
Civil liability is also extended to:
An agent or other person who knowingly causes or gives substan-
tial assistance to conduct by another person (herein a
"principal") giving rise to liability under this Code ...with
knowledge that the conduct is unlawful or a breach of duty, or
involves a fraudulent act, a misrepresentation, or non-disclosure
of a fact of special significance by an insider (as defined in section
1603(b)). 120
More commonly referred to as an "aider and abettor" under rule
10b-5,'' a violator of this proscription is subject to sanctions equal
to those imposed upon the primary violator by virtue of his
''substantial assistance" in the commission of the violation.
The knowledge of the "assisting person" is the primary issue in
determining liability hereunder. In light of the fact that
"knowledge" is not defined by the Code,' and because this provi-
sion taken as a whole appears to reflect the present law, the con-
structions given to it in this context under rule 10b-5 should be
maintained.
115. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724 (1)(2).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)(1976).
117. In that situation he would, of course, be subject to direct liability for his acts.
118. Such reasons could be, for example, those behind the common law of agency. See
note 113 supra and materials cited therein.
119. This is unlike the near-absolute liability of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1976), for false registration statements which, it can be argued, provides greater
incentive for careful preparation of registration statements. See Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1969). Yet even in this
area a "due diligence" defense was recognized. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643, 693-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
120. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(b)(1).
121. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
122. "Know' and its derivatives are not defined. Their meaning is left to construction
in context." FED. SEC. CODE § 287(a).
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In light of the determination by the Supreme Court in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder'23 that mere negligent conduct is insufficient to
give rise to a private right of action under rule 10b-5, constructive
knowledgq, without more, would seem to be an inadequate basis
upon which to charge one with "aiding and abetting." Any other
inference would be suspect because constructive knowledge is insuf-
ficient to support a private cause of action against the primary
violator.' 4 When 'the "assisting person," however, acts in reckless
disregard of whether he is aiding in a violation, a failure to find a
violation would be tantamount to endorsing what is, at best, con-
duct inimical to the proscriptions' goals of honesty and protection.' 5
An "assisting person" must give "substantial assistance" be-
fore liability will arise. As in a rule 10b-5 judgment, liability will
hinge upon a factual inquiry. While it is not necessary that the
assistance given be indispensable to the commission of the primary
violation,' 6 it must be more than ministerial.'27 Where there is a
factual finding that "substantial assistance" has been given with
"knowledge" that the activity being assisted is violative, full liabil-
ity for the primary violation is imposed on the assisting person.'2
A special kind of aiding and abetting is described separately in
subsection (c).'20 In essence, one who passes on inside information,
a "tipper," assists in the violation of the prohibition against insider
trading'30 when his "tippee" trades on the basis of that data. With-
out a prohibition subjecting the "tipper" to liability for his assis-
tance:
insiders could easily evade their duty to refrain from trading on
the basis of insider information. Either the transactions so traded
123. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
124. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
125. Such a construction appears consistent with the apparent resolution by the Code
of the "reckless disregard" question left open in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
194 n.12 (1976). See FED. SEC. CODE § 299.50 (defining scienter in terms of reckless disregard).
126. See, e.g., Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969).
127. See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. See note 169 and accompanying text infra (discussing the measures of damages for
violations).
129. An insider within section 1603(b)(1) to (3) inclusive (herein a "tipper")
who discloses to an insider within section 1603(b)(4) (herein a "tippee"), or a
tippee who discloses to another tippee, a material fact that is not generally avail-
able is liable under section 1703 (a) and (b) to the same extent as a tippee who is
so liable, unless he (1) disclosed the fact for a proper purpose and in a proper
manner and (2) reasonably believed that his tippee would not use the fact so as
to become so liable.
FED. SEC. CODE § 1724 (c). See notes 57-89 and accompanying text supra, for a discussion of
§ 1603.
130. Id. § 1603(a).
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could be concluded by a relative or an acquaintance of the insid-
er, or implied understandings could arise under which reciprocal
tips between insiders in different corporations could be given. "'
In thisway the Code prevents an insider from doing indirectly what
he would be prevented from doing directly.
The occurrence of two events will trigger this liability. The first
requisite is that the tipper disclose "a material fact that is not
generally available."'32 The second is that the "tippee" trade on the
basis of that information. Only then will the "tipper" be liable to
the same degree as the "tippee." There is a proviso to the general
rule, however, excepting liability where the "tipper" can show that
he gave the information for a proper purpose, in a proper manner, ' :"
reasonably believing that the "tippee" would not use the infbrma-
tion for trading.3 '
D. Joint and Several Liability
The Code allows an injured party bringing a cause of action
only one satisfaction of judgment no matter how many persons are
liable to him.'35 As a result of this joint and several liability, there
is no need to join multiple defendants in an action; a secondary
violator has the same liability as the primary one. Similarly, there
are several sections in the present securities acts providing expressly
131. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
132. While an insider himself is prohibited from trading if he knows "a fact of special
significance. . . that is not generally available," FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a), he becomes liable
as a "tipper" if he discloses "a material fact that is not generally available .... " Id. §
1724(c). It is not clear how these two standards differ under the Code. Compare id. § 257
(defining "fact of special significance") with id. §§ 256, 293 (defining "fact" and "material").
The policy inherent in both § 1603(a) and § 1724(c) is to deny trading advantage to anyone
who has access to information which is not available to the general public. See note 57 supra.
By using different phrases in the two provisions and by defining one to encompass conceivably
more information than another, the Code creates an ambiguity which will undoubtedly lead
to unnecessary litigation without furthering the policy underlying the imposition of liability.
133. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(c)(1). A proper disclosure may be one interpreted to be made
in the course of a company's business. See, e.g., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
134. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(e)(2). Note, however, that the term "reasonable belief'
suggests a negligence standard for liability. This represents an expansion of lOb-5 civil liabili-
ties beyond Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("we are quite unwilling
to extend the scope of the statute [§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5] to negligent conduct").
135. "All liability under this Code . . . including section 1724, is joint and several, but
a plaintiff may iot recover, through satisfaction of judgment against more than one person,
more than the amount recoverable without regard to section 1724(d)." FED. SEC. CODE §
1724(d).
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for joint and several liability,'36 although rule 10b-5 does not. The
courts, however, have implied it in various forms.'37
Where joint and several liability arises in a suit against multi-
ple defendants, all the issues are not necessarily resolved. Although
a- plaintiff may win a judgment and receive satisfaction on it from
one or more defendants, the latter still must determine for them-
selves the apportionment of the judgment through contribution.
When liability under rule 10b-5 is derivative, there are questions of
indemnification through insurance' 38 or by corporate contract or cor-
porate by-laws. 13 As in tort law, these unresolved issues are compli-
cated by judicial considerations of public policy. While it is true
that a securities violator pays damages to an injured party to com-
pensate him for his injury, it is also true that under some sections
the threat of liability is meant to be a deterrent for the proscribed
behavior. Therefore, if indemnification is permitted, the deterrent
effect of the liability is abated. Although the issue of indemnifica-
tion, either by contract with the insurance company or the corpora-
tion, has not been extensively litigated, it has been permitted where
an analysis of the policy behind the statutory liability is compensa-
tory rather than punitive."10
The Code specifies a framework within which indemnification
other than by insurance is allowed if it meets standards established
by the Commission by rule or by the courts through legal and equi-
136. Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
137. E.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1956) (imposed without discus-
sion); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (tort law authority cited).
138. Insurance policies for securities liability fall into two general categories. One encom-
passes general blanket policies covering all liability incurred by an officer or director in his
official capacity, as well as those purchased covering all underwritings made over a period of
time. The other includes policies covering only a specific offering. Kroll, Some Reflections
on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and
Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681, 685 (1969) [hereinafter Reflections].
139. Some states have enacted expressly exclusive indemnification statutes with regard
to directors and officers. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP'. CODE § 317 (West 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 727 (McKinney 1979). Others are non-exclusive, permitting a corporation to adopt indemni-
fication by-laws broader than the statute provides. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145
(f)(1974). Underwriter indemnification, however, is usually contractual.
140. For example, in Globus v. Law Research, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), indemnity was held to be contrary to public policy under
the Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), because the intent of the legislation
was punitive rather than compensatory. On the contrary, the standards under 10b-5 are
analogous to tort standards for negligence. This indicates a parallel compensatory intent
making indemnification and insurance reimbursement more appropriate. See Reflections,
supra note 139, at 687-88.
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table precedent. The operative method' is a weighing and balanc-
ing of the losses to the indemnitee and indemnitor and the effect of
those losses on the deterrent nature of the liability. This issue is a
federal question, not influenced by state policies in state indemnifi-
cation statutes.' Indemnification, however, "is invalid to the ex-
tent that the indemnitee is found guilty of bad faith, intentional
misfeasance, or reckless disregard of his obligations and duties to
the indemnitor or its security holder.'
' 43
On the other hand, insurance indemnification is given a blan-
ket acceptance.'" This seemingly double standard is obviated by the
self-policing mechanism of most insurance policies. Because it is
unlikely that insurers would extend coverage to intentional miscon-
duct, the policy of the Code is protected. The cost of liability would
fall on the intentional actor while the merely negligent violator
would be allowed reimbursement. Thus, there are three ways in
which indemnification can be denied: by the Commission by rule,
the courts by equity, and the insurer by contract.
Contribution, a counterpart to indemnity, has been available
to 10b-5 violators in some cases, but is not a clearly established
right.'45 The Code also allows contribution for civil liability where
to do so would be consistent with the indemnification provisions
discussed previously.4 6 Jointly liable persons may allocate liability
141. There is an underwriter exception to the general rules of § 1724 which codifies
existing commission procedures. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(e)(2) & n.1.
142. An indemnification provision, whether contained in a statute, a bylaw
or similar instrument, or a contract (other than a contract of insurance by an
insurance company), is valid, apart from the expenses of a successful defense,
only to the extent that
(A) the Commission provides by rule on consideration of such factors
as the respective gains and losses of the indemnitor and indemnitee
and the deterrent effect of the particular type of liability, or
(B) a court determines in accordance with the principles of common
law and equity, applied as a matter of federal jurisprudence without
regard to the statutory or other law of any State, and on consideration
of the factors specified in section 1724(e)(3)(A).
Id. § 1724(e)(3).
143. Id. § 1724(e)(5).
144. "An insurance contract written by an insurance company is valid irrespective of (A)
any State law to the contrary or (B) whether the premium is paid by the insured or any other
person." Id. § 1724(e)(4). This provision does not override the authority of states to prevent
issuance of this insurance. Id. § 1724 note (4).
145. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969) (recogniz-
ing it in dictum); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968)
(recognizing a cause of action for contribution by way of a third party complaint). But see
State Mutual Life Assur. Co., v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202, 210-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dismissing third party complaint for contribution).
146. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(f).
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by contract either before or after liability is imposed." 7 Where there
is no contract, "on consideration of the relative responsibility of
each person for the loss incurred,"'48 an order may be included in a
judgment requiring just and equitable payments between the defen-
dants, even to~the extent of contribution amounting to indemnity.
Alternatively, the court may determine that there is no liability for
contribution. In any event no one may be ordered to pay more in
contribution than his maximum liability would have been had he
been a defendant in the primary action.'49
V. OTHER DEFENSES
In any action for civil liability, a defendant may argue that,
either by agreement or by conduct, the parties have modified the
availability of recovery under the securities laws. The Code ex-
pressly sets forth the requirements and limits of such defenses.
A. Waiver
Waiver' is one such defense. Under present securities laws, a
contract provision in which a party waives, prior to breach, the right
of action for noncompliance by another with the securities laws, is
void. '' Nevertheless, once a right under 10b-5 has matured and the
plaintiff knows of the breach, his rights can then be waived.'
Waiver under the Code is less restrictive. Present law voids
such a contractual provision ab initio. The Code voids it as well but
adds a proviso that it may operate where the parties are of equal
bargaining strength as determined by their level of sophistication.'
147. Id. § 1724(f)(1).
148. Id. § 1724(f)(2).
149. Id.
150. " '[Tlhe voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964).
151. Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976). Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976). Courts have recognized the extension of this to 10b-5
actions. See Note, Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act: A "Legislative Chaperon"
for Rule lOb-5, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 449, 502 (1968-69).
152. Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1974); Royal
Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962)(purpose of Securities Exchange
Act is not to protect a wronged investor who waits to see how his investment turns out before
invoking the Act).
153. A purported waiver of compliance with this Code . . . or a rule of reco-
very thereunder is void . . . (2) unless it is determined, on consideration of the
financial and legal sophistication of the parties and the relationship between
them, that the public policy underlying this Code does not require the application
of this subsection.
FED. SEC. CODE § 1725(a).
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It does void a provision, even where there is equal bargaining power,
when it is in the interest of public policy to do so. '
The Code delimits waiver in another manner by declaring any
"hold harmless" agreements given by investment companies to
directors, officers, investment advisors or underwriters void where
such person's liability to the company or its security holders arises
from "bad faith, intentional misfeasance, or reckless disregard of his
obligations and duties."'55 This not only prevents emasculation of
the deterrent provided by civil liability, but also proscribes at-
tempts at an "end-run" around the limitations on indemnifica-
tion.' 6 By disallowing these agreements, shareholder derivative
suits are made possible if an investment corporation chooses not to
sue one of the foregoing persons on a 10b-5 type violation.
Agreements to arbitrate civil liability have largely been prohib-
ited under present securities laws because they are analagous to a
waiver.'57 Extending the waiver analysis to the Code, where the
parties have sufficiently equivalent bargaining power, such an
agreement could be construed as a "waiver of compliance with this
Code" and thereby be enforceable under section 1725(a)(2).'11 Oth-
erwise, an advance agreement to arbitrate will not be a defense to
an action. Such agreements, however, are enforceable among mem-
bers of self-regulatory organizations.'59 In contrast, these restrictions
are not intended to affect good-faith settlements or agreements to
arbitrate after the dispute arises. IS°
154. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
155. FED. SEC. CODE § 1725(b).
156. See notes 138-143 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 140 supra. One exception was recognized where an international contract
for sale of a business required arbitration of disputes. The Supreme Court held that that
agreement was controlling, requiring the pending 10b-5 action to be subordinated to the
arbitration provision agreed upon by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 and 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1976). Scherk v. Albertq-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974). Absent the international
context, however, arbitration clauses have been voided. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430,
434-35 (1953).
158. See note 153 supra.
159. Self-regulatory organizations include national securities exchanges, registered se-
curities associations, registered clearing agencies, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.54. Such organizations may act free of the restrictions of § 1725
when settling disputes between their members or participants. FED. SEC. CODE § 1725(c)(2).
The Code permits an advance agreement to arbitrate disagreements arising over the rules of
these agencies so long as the rule in question does not contravene the Code or a Commission
interpretation of the Code or a judicial interpretation of it. Id. § 1725(c)(3).
160. Id. § 1725(c)(1).
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B. Plaintiff's Conduct as a Defense
In pari delicto is a defense predicated on the plaintiff's conduct
which may be raised under the Code:
In a private action created by or based on a violation of this Code
. . . the defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto are valid
only to the extent (which may be complete) that it is so deter-
mined on consideration of (1) the deterrent effect of the particu-
lar type of liability, (2) the financial and legal sophistication of
the parties, and (3) their relative responsibility for the loss in-
curred."'1
The defense is available where the plaintiff has committed a wrong
against the defendant in the same transaction as that in which the
plaintiff claims injury or where both plaintiff and defendant had a
mutual intent to commit the same violation.' It has been recog-
nized under section 1725(d), which codifies the factors to be consid-
ered in a decision to allow these defenses in a 10b-5 charge.'" By
limiting the defenses in this way, violations by a plaintiff in prior
or subsequent transactions will not abrogate the defendant's liabil-
ity in the, present transaction.
In keeping with this apparent policy to limit defenses - unless
there is an equitable reason to permit them - is the flexibility of
the statute of limitations defense under rule 10b-5. The defense
exists only as imposed by the courts because section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 do not express a limitations period and there is no generally
applicable statutory period under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.'11 Where a federal statute is silent on a statute of limitations,
the court may use the statute of limitations from an applicable state
statute, incorporating it into the federal common law, or may create
a reasonable one as a matter of federal common law where the state
statute does not further federal policies. 5
161. Id. § 1725(d). "Unclean hands" is a companion defense to in pari delicto. It operates
to bar a plaintiff from affirmative equitable relief where he himself is guilty of unlawful or
inequitable conduct regarding the same transaction. See Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Mogul Mines, Ltd., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,834 at
96,804 (D.D.C. 1974).
162. See Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 601 (5th Cir. 1975) (some unconsciona-
ble act committed by one seeking relief that has an immediate and necessary relation to the
relief sought); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n.1l (S.D.N.Y.
1971) ("generally contemplates equal and simultaneous participation by the parties in the
same illegal activity").
163. See Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d at 602-604.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
165. See, e.g., U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-705 (1966).
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The negative aspect of this procedure is that it has resulted in
varying treatment for different plaintiffs, not only because different
states have different time limits, but also because there is no uni-
formity on the choice-of-law issue as to which state limitations
period should be chosen for the 10b-5 action. 6 ' The Code sets forth
a specific limitations period for 10b-5-type actions. An action may
be brought up to one year after the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the violation, but not more than five years after the
purchase or sale by the plaintiff."7 This represents a long-needed
improvement in the securities laws by freeing judicial time from
complex determinations of applicable state law. 68
VI. REMEDIES
A. Damages Under 10b-5
Rule 10b-5 contains no express provisions concerning the reme-
dies available in a private action. Thus, courts have implied private
rights of action under the rationale of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak. 170 The
broad guidelines stated in that case indicated that the federal courts
should adjust the private remedies "so as to grant the necessary
relief. . . to make good the wrong done.""' Courts have since recog-
nized the availability of both legal and equitable remedies'72 and
have refused to honor any contractually created limitations. "
This implied grant of authority under such general guidelines
has resulted in a case-by-case analysis with concomitant variations
in the measurement of damages. Among the minimal restraints put
upon damages calculations are the broad requirements that "no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provi-
166. Compare, e.g., Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1971)
(applying Alabama limitations period for common law fraud-1 year) with Denny v. Perform-
ance Sys., Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,387 at 91,981 (M.D.
Tenn. 1971)(applying Tennessee catch-all statute of limitations-10 years).
167. FED. SEC. CODE § 1727(b).
168. See 5 JACOBS supra note 23, at § 235 passim (1978).
169. Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (d) (1976), which
authorizes the Commission to bring an action for any violation of the 1934 Act and the rules
and regulations thereunder, is the only express provision relating to implied rights of action.
170. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Although this was a private action brought for violation of §
14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976), the Court's analysis was broadly focused on the
propriety and necessity of providing "such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose" behind the 1934 Act. 377 U.S. at 433.
171. Id.
172. See Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizing
the power to undo transactions or award damages).
173. See, e.g., Special Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971).
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sions of [the Exchange Act] shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment . . .a total amount in excess of his actual damage on
account of the act complained of,"'74 and that "damages are recover-
able only to the extent that they can be shown."'75 Beyond this, it
has been left to the courts to determine and apply measures of
damages when the question arises in diverse factual scenarios.'
7"
An often used measure is "the difference between the fair value
of all that the [defrauded] seller received, and the fair value of
what he would have received had there been no fraudulent con-
duct.' 17 7 Value is determined as of the date of the transaction,'7 1 so
that the plaintiff recovers his "out-of-pocket" losses due to the vio-
lation.
In some cases a defrauded seller has recovered under an alter-
native "cover"17 ' measure of damage.""0 While under this measure,
the plaintiff need not actually "cover"," ' he can recover the differ-
ence between the value he received upon the sale and the highest
value the security attained within a reasonable time after the plain-
tiff discovered or should have discovered the fraud.' 2 This provides
an alternative to a plaintiff who would have had no recovery under
the "out-of-pocket" measure.'
Defrauded buyers have an alternative measure that is com-
monly referred to as the Chasins measure. In Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co.,"'8 the plaintiff had been induced to purchase stocks
from the defendant without disclosure of the latter's interest in
them. Thus, the "evil [was] not the price at which Chasins bought
but the fact of being induced to buy and invest for some future
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). This was recognized as applicable to 10b-5 actions in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
175. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 378, 389 (1970).
176. See generally Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the
Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1977).
177. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 155. See also, e.g., Harris v.
American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975). The converse of this measure is used
where a buyer has been defrauded.
178. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 745 (8th Cir. 1967).
179. "Cover" refers to the replacement of an item after a seller has breached a duty to
deliver. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 and comment (c) thereto (1937).
180. See 5B JACOBS, supra note 23, at § 260.03[c][iii].
181. See, e.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718 (8th Cir. 1967).
182. Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969).
183. This may occur, for example, where there is a misstatement of technical information
that when truthfully disclosed would take a period of days to have an impact upon the price
of a security.
184. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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growth in these stocks without disclosure of Smith, Barney's inter-
est . . . "'85 The Chasins court held that under such circumstances
the proper measure of damages is the difference between the pur-
chase price and the amount the buyer received upon his subsequent
sale of the securities prior to his becoming aware of the violation of
the Securities Exchange Act. Under such a formula, which is similar
in some respects to the seller's "cover" remedy, a buyer can recover
the difference between the amount he paid for the security and the
lowest price it reached within a reasonable period after the plaintiff
discovered or should have discovered the fraud.
Damages measurement in 10b-5 actions is, therefore, far from
uniformly established. Profound differences may result from the
courts' discretionary applications of the many formulae available to
cases involving market transactions. Any of the measures could
impose a very large liability upon a defendant without regard to the
seriousness of his misconduct, the realistic market impact of his
actions, or the actual influence which his actions had on the trading
decisions of a potential multitude of claimants.' The Code, on the
other hand, brings much needed stability to this area. Along with
defining the method of measuring damages, it sets forth the condi-
tions under which alternative measures may be applied and author-
izes adjustments where the transaction occurs in a market setting.
B. Damages Under the Code
Where the plaintiff is a buyer in a non-market transaction, 7
the general rule allows him to recover the difference between the
amount paid (plus interest) and the value of the security as of the
end of a reasonable period, less any return received while he held
the security.8 8 The "reasonable period" referred to is a reasonable
time after the truth regarding the fraudulent act or misrepresen-
tation becomes evident, the inside information becomes "generally
available," or the plaintiff acquires actual knowledge.'88 This cre-
ates an open-ended standard that allows a court to determine on the
facts of each case when a plaintiff's claim ceases to be the result of
the defendant's conduct and in reality is the result of the plaintiff's
185. Id. at 1173.
186. This may be especially true in the context of class actions. See Green v. Occidental
Petrol Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
187. FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(a).
188. Id. § 1708(a)(1).
189. Id. § 1703(h)(1).
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inaction. "' If the plaintiff has sold any of that class and series of
securities after his purchase but before the end of the reasonable
period discussed above, his recovery is reduced by the amount re-
ceived on the sale.' In this way the plaintiff will not be unjustly
enriched by any profits he makes on the interim sales. Under this
method of measurement a compensatory result is achieved. The
plaintiff, rather than unjustly benefitting from any profits made on
interim sales, recovers the net loss suffered in the violative transac-
tion.
A different measure, however, may apply:
[T]o the extent that the defendant bought a security of the class
and series after his sale on which the action is based and before
the end of the reasonable period . . . at a profit (compared with
his sale price to the plaintiff) greater than the measure of dam-
ages as defined in the foregoing portion of secion 1708(a)(1), the
measure of damages is that profit . . 92
This formula is directed more at deterrence than compensation, for
without it a defendant might risk being caught in a violation in
exchange for the opportunity to obtain greater profits.
The Code provides for similar measures of damages where the
plaintiff is a seller instead of a buyer. In this case the general rule
provides for recovery of "the value of the security as of the end of'
the reasonable period . . . plus any return (with interest) that the
buyer received on the security, less the amount (with interest) that
the plaintiff received" on the sale." 3 If the plaintiff bought a
"security of the class and series after his sale" before the reasonable
period expired, his recovery would be adjusted by the difference
between that purchase price and the sale price to defendant. Addi-
tionally, if the defendant is able to sell that security at a relative
profit during that time period, the plaintiff will be able to recover
that profit if it exceeds the amount the general measure of damages
provides for him. "5
In the market transaction, these same measures are used, ad-
justed by several additional considerations. For example, no altera-
tions are made in the measure of damages for subsequent purchases
190. See id. § 1703(g).
191. Id. § 1708(a)(1)(A).
192. Id. § 1708(a)(1)(B).
193. Id. § 1708(a)(2).
194. Id. § 1708(a)(2)(A).
195. Id. § 1708 (a)(2)(B).
196. Id. § 1703(b).
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or sales by a selling or buying plaintiff.'97 While it has been asserted
that permitting such alterations in the market context is inappro-
priate,' a plaintiff who has mitigated his loss by trading in the
interim period may be unjustly enriched by a recovery based upon
the unadjusted general measure of damages. Despite their obvious
impact, the ramifications of such factors to a defendant may be
lessened by other adjustments to the market situation. Further-
more, the defendant may also reduce the amount of his liability by
proving that his violation did not cause part or all of the loss.'" He
may demonstrate this with proof that his actions were not "a sub-
stantial factor in producing the loss" or that the loss was not of the
kind that "might reasonably have been expected" to occur as a
result of the violation.2 N
Regardless of the effects these variables may-have upon the
determination of damages, the Code makes it explicit that:
[tihe measure [of damages] (apart from any assessment of con-
sequential damages or costs under section 1723(a) and (d)) is
limited as if all the plaintiffs, together with all the members of
the class in the case of a class action, had bought (or sold) only
the amount of securities that the defendant had sold (or
bought) . . 20
The application of this limitation is easily understood in the insider
trading situation,202 where the defendant is by definition buying or
selling. It may also be applicable to actions for violation by fraudu-
lent act or misrepresentation, 3 because the defendant may commit
the violation without trading. Nonetheless, it would seem that this
limitation applies only where the defendant commits a violation by
his act of trading. 04
197. Id. § 1708(b)(1).
198. Id. § 1708, note (3).
199. Id. § 1708(b)(2). This may also prove to reduce damages in a 10b-5 action, but as
with that whole area of damages its use and parameters are not clearly defined. See 5B
JACOBS, supra note 23 at § 260.03(f)(ii).
200. FED. SEC. CODE § 220. It may be argued that to the extent that the plaintiff's
damages were mitigated by his purchase or sale during the interim period, the defendant's
conduct did not cause a loss. See note 197 supra and accompanying text.
201. Id. § 1708(b)(3). The Code also delineates procedures whereby a defendant who is
sued in more than one district court may protect himself from liability in excess of this
provision. Once notice is given of the multiple suits against the defendant, the litigation will
be transferred to a multidistrict judicial panel for such disposition as "will promote just and
efficient conduct of the litigation." Id. § 1711.
202. Id. § 1603.
203. Id. § 1703(i).
204. This construction is possible under the power of the court to vary remedies as may
be necessary. See id. § 1723(e).
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C. Rescission
As was stated earlier, equitable as well as legal remedies have
been implied under rule 10b-5. Rescission is one such remedy, "" and
is available where the violation occurs in a nonmarket transaction."'l
The plaintiff-buyer can, upon tendering the security back to the
defendant-seller, recover "the amount that he paid (with interest)
less any return (with interest) that he received on the security.
'"2 t 7
This amount may be further reduced by "any decrease that the
defendant proves to have occurred in the market or other available
price of the security since a reasonable period after" the material
facts became generally available or the plaintiff acquired actual
knowledge of those facts.' 8 Where the plaintiff is a seller, he can
recover the securities sold upon tender to the defendant of the
amount received (with interest) on the sale, "less any return (with
interest) that the buyer received on the security."2 "" In addition, the
seller must remit any increase in the price of the security that the
defendant proves occurred after the previously described "rea-
sonable period" elapsed. °10 In all cases the plaintiff has the right
to choose this remedy rather than damages except where the court
finds that "rescission would unduly affect the rights of third parties
or would be impractical." ''
D. Other Amounts Recoverable
Incidental relief is available under the Code in the same man-
ner as in rule 10b-5 actions." 2 Consequential and incidental dam-
ages can be recovered where the plaintiff proves they resulted from
the conduct on which the action is based."' They are not, however,
subject to the market transaction limitations on amounts recovera-
205. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc. 496 F.2d 1255, 1268 (4th
Cir. 1974).
206. "If the transaction is not effected in a manner that would make the matching of
buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates .. .is liable...
for rescission or damages." FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(a) (emphasis added). The market transac-
tion (§ 1703(b)) provides only for damages.
207. Id. § 1702(d)(1).
208. Id. § 1703(h)(1).
209. Id. § 1702(d)(2).
210. Id. § 1703(h)(2).
211. Id. § 1723(f). It is likely that even if rescission were an available remedy in market
transactions, this provision would usually preclude its use.
212. See 5B JAcoBs, supra note 23 at § 260.03 [d-g].
213. FED. SEC. CODE § 1723(a)(1).
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ble, 14 and punitive damages are not available.' ' Prejudgment inter-
est, however, is recoverable, whether as part of the general measure
of damages or as the court may otherwise direct. ' Additionally, the
Code provides that where a court finds "bad faith or lack of merit"
17
in the cause of action or defenses raised, it may assess costs, includ-
ing attorney's fees, against "any party at any time to give an under-
taking for the payment of such costs." '
Finally, a court may shape relief to fit a particular case, within
certain limits. ' In doing so the court cannot disturb the right of a
defendant to reduce the extent of his liability by proving a lack of
causation; nor can it impose punitive damages.2 ' A court may, how-
ever, permit variation in the definitions of rescission and measures
of damages "on a showing that a different definition . . . would be
plainly more appropriate on consideration of such factors as the
plaintiff's loss, the defendant's profit, and the deterrent effect of the
particular type of liability.""' In this manner, courts will not be
foreclosed by the statutory scheme from dealing appropriately with
"the 'J. Rufus Wallingford' type . . [who] would lie awake nights
endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading
the law"' through manipulations that frustrate the remedies pro-
vided by the Code.
VII. CONCLUSION
The codification of 10b-5 issues has not resulted in major sub-
stantive changes in the existing statutory and decisional law. Clari-
fication and objectification of this law, and the elimination of much
of the overlap which previously plagued the civil liability statutes
are the greatest gifts of the Code to the securities field. While the
draftsmen have perhaps failed to revamp the tangled web of the
securities law, the monumental effort of the Code to inject harmony
214. Id. § 1723(a)(2).
215. Nor are "damages for emotional distress." Id. § 1723(b). There is no need to provide
such additional incentives to encourage the filing of securities fraud actions. The widespread
range of sanctions available to the Commission, when combined with the prospect of liability,
provides a more than adequate deterrent. Cf. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d
1223, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 1970).
216. FED. SEC. CODE § 1723(c).
217. Id. § 1723(d).
218. Id.
219. Id. § 1723(e).
220. Id. § 1723(e)(2-3).
221. Id. § 1723(e).
222. Sperry & Hutchison Co. v. Hudson, 190 Or. 458, 468-469, 226 P.2d 501, 505 (Or.
1950) (en banc).
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into the area is most valuable.
Yet the described scope of civil liability under the Code is not
and has not been fixed. The Commission is specifically empowered
to "define . . . the conditions and restrictions" of the prohibitions
in the Code by rule."' It can also decree that rules of self-regulatory
organizations receive the same treatment and give rise to liability
as if they were express Code provisions." Finally, the judiciary is
authorized to recognize a private action based on the proscriptions
of the Code, even if there is no express liability under Part XVII.25
The ramifications of these provisions can only be appreciated,22'
however, after they have been utilized.
On balance, though, the clarity and ease of use provided by a
codification like this is a distinct improvement over the patchwork
of present statutes and the presently nebulous private cause of ac-
tion. Furthermore, the use of internally consistent standards and
definitions is more conducive to the establishment of a comprehen-
sive system of regulation. While some may object to the Code for
its general failure to revise the present law, it should be remembered
that an internally consistent statute may allow more accurate anal-
ysis and projection of the alternatives available to the investor
when he enters the securities marketplace.
223. FED. SEC. CODE § 1614.
224. Id. § 1721(b).
225. Id. § 1722(a).
226. In this context, one should be aware of the broad power which the Commission will
be able to wield if the Code is enacted.
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